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Impression management and retrospective sense-making in corporate annual reports: 
banks’ graphical reporting during the global financial crisis 
Michael John Jones, Andrea Melis, Silvia Gaia, Simone Aresu 
 
Abstract:  
This study investigates two potentially complementary reporting scenarios in annual reports: reactive 
impression management and retrospective sense-making. It examines stock market performance 
graphs in European listed banks’ annual reports before and during the global financial crisis. Our 
results indicate that banks reacted to the global financial crisis by omitting stock market performance 
graphs from the annual report and from its most prominent sections. On the other hand, banks 
reduced favourable distortions and favourable performance comparisons. No significant evidence of 
retrospective sense-making is found. Overall, the findings are consistent with impression 
management incorporating human cognitive biases, with companies preferring misrepresentation by 
omission over misrepresentation by commission. Under high public scrutiny, banks appear to seek to 
provide a more favourable view by concealing negative information, rather than by favourable 
distortions or comparisons. The study contributes to the development of impression management 
theories. It uses a psychological interpretation that incorporates human cognitive biases, rather than 
adopting a purely economically-based perspective. 
   
Keywords: Graphs, impression management, omission bias, retrospective sense-making, stock 
market performance. 
 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
Financial reporting is an important type of business communication which is highly 
regulated. However, one area where plenty of scope exists for discretion and interpretation is 
graphs. Graphs play an important role in determining users’ perception of the company 
(Penrose, 2008). Moreover, they are an eye-catching presentational format, frequently used 
in annual reports, as ‘an integral part of a company’s overall disclosure strategy’ (Beattie & 
Jones, 2008, p. 71). They attract the reader’s attention, facilitate comparisons, synthesise key 
performance indicators in a readily accessible form, contextualize performance (Beattie & 
Jones, 2001; Frownfelter-Lohrke & Fulkerson, 2001; Hill & Milner, 2003) and improve 
decision making (Hirsch, Seubert, & Sohn, 2015; Penrose, 2008). In addition, graphs can 
influence investors’ judgements of earnings’ current performance and earnings potential 
(Dilla, Janvrin, & Jeffrey, 2013).  
However, Penrose (2008) has pointed out that more research is needed in graphical reporting 
as graphs can also be used opportunistically to manipulate users’ perceptions of companies’ 
performance (Beattie & Jones, 2008; Courtis, 1997). Our study aims to investigate graphical 
impression management and retrospective sense-making of major European listed banks in a 
time of intense public scrutiny, the global financial crisis. The systematic financial downturn 
provides an opportunity to analyse psychological factors that can influence how annual 
report preparers react when exposed to public visibility. Reactive impression management 
and retrospective sense-making can both be part of a reactive perspective (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2011). Reactive impression management is how preparers respond in a self-serving 
way to concerns, increased scrutiny and/or public pressure (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011). 
Retrospective sense-making is aimed at giving voluntary, non-self-serving, ex-post 
explanations of organisational outcomes and events that have already occurred, to sustain or 
restore a company’s image (Aerts, 2005; Merkl-Davies, Brennan, & McLeay, 2011; Stanton 
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& Stanton, 2002). Sense-making, more broadly, can be defined as the process through which 
people work to understand unclear issues or events (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). 
In this article, we focus on stock market performance graphs as they portray key financial 
information and are frequently graphed within annual reports (Falschlunger, Eisl, Losbichler, 
& Greil, 2015). Stock market performance graphs have been encouraged by regulators such 
as the SEC. However, they have been generally neglected in the previous literature (see 
Beattie & Jones, 2008 for a review). They can assist users to assess management 
performance and compare it with reported benchmarks (Bannister & Newman, 2006; 
Lewellen, Park, & Ro, 1996). Stock market performance graphs are also likely to be of key 
interest to annual report users and to be under intense public scrutiny during the global 
financial crisis. As share prices fell dramatically, the potential need to conceal negative 
organisational outcomes became imperative. Thus, focusing on banks’ stock market 
performance graphs before and during the global financial crisis, represents a unique setting 
in which to investigate graphical reporting behaviour in times of an extremely high public 
scrutiny. 
This study makes the following contributions. First, it contributes to impression management 
theory by analysing two partially complementary and competing approaches: an 
economically-based approach and a psychologically-based approach. The former is based on 
economic-rationality and assumes that actors are rational and act opportunistically to 
maximise their utility, calculating the expected consequences of each choice (Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan, 2011). The psychological approach assumes that individuals’ judgments and 
decisions are influenced by different representations of the same problem (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; 1986) due to bounded rationality (Simon, 2000) and cognitive biases. In 
particular, this study focuses on omission bias, i.e. the tendency of human beings to evaluate 
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wrongful omissions less harshly than wrongful commissions, even when the negative 
consequences are equivalent (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). 
Second, this study responds to Sandell and Svensson’s (2016) call for research on the use of 
accounts during the global financial crisis, by investigating these two theories before and 
during the global financial crisis. The global financial crisis led to more intense public 
scrutiny and pressure on companies (Barth & Landsman, 2010). Such a change in the 
external environment from economic instability to public visibility can threaten companies’ 
organisational legitimacy (Patelli & Pedrini, 2014) and lead managers to make different 
disclosure choices (Aerts, 2005; Carter & Dukerich, 1998; Sandell & Svensson, 2016). We 
test whether and how impression management omission techniques (e.g. selective use of 
graphs) and commission techniques (e.g. graphs’ favourable distortion) were employed.  
Banks are particularly interesting because they were central to the global financial crisis 
(Barth & Landsman, 2010) and thus under the media spotlight. As their performance was 
severely hit (Beltratti &Stulz, 2012) and their managers considered responsible for the crisis 
(Hargie, Stapleton, & Tourish, 2010), banks needed to restore their reputation and maintain 
their legitimacy (Linsley and Kajüter, 2008; Oliveira et al. 2013). Therefore, this focus on 
banks provides us the opportunity to analyse the psychological factors that could influence 
annual report preparers’ communication strategies when exposed to intense visibility and 
scrutiny. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop 
the theoretical framework and hypotheses. We then present our research methodology, 
including sample selection, data gathering and classification of graphs. We present our 
findings in section four, followed in section five by our discussion and conclusion. 
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2. Impression management and retrospective sense-making: literature review and 
hypotheses’ development. 
2.1. Impression management 
Impression management in corporate annual reporting assumes that managers are self- 
interested and misrepresent information in the annual report in order to pursue their personal 
interests rather than those of users (e.g., Beattie & Jones, 1992; 2000a; 2008, Hooghiemstra, 
2000; Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). In line with this perspective, previous studies have 
concluded that graphs in corporate reports are mostly used to manipulate readers’ 
perceptions of corporate performance and to provide them with a more favourable view than 
is warranted (Beattie & Jones, 2008). Information can be misrepresented opportunistically in 
two ways: by omission or by commission. Previous studies based on economics do not 
distinguish between the two (e.g. Leung, Parker, & Courtis, 2015).   
The first form of omission is when managers selectively omit certain graphs with 
unfavourable information but include those with favourable information. In this way, 
companies can present their performance in the best possible light (e.g., Beattie & Jones, 
1992; 2000a; Beattie, Dhanani, & Jones, 2008; Dilla & Janvrin, 2010; Falschlunger et al., 
2015; Steinbart, 1989) and divert annual report users’ attention away from the companies’ 
negative news (Leung et al., 2015). Second, omission also involves non-disclosure in 
prominent parts of the annual report. As users tend to read annual reports briefly (Bartlett & 
Chandler, 1997; Penrose, 2008; Squiers, 1989), the location of a graph becomes extremely 
important (Beattie & Jones, 2001).1 
Misrepresentation by commission occurs when companies use techniques aimed at 
manipulating performance trends via fabrication or exaggeration, such as measurement 
distortion and the strategic choice of cross-sectional performance comparisons (Beattie et al., 
2008; Beattie & Jones, 1992; 2000b; Cassar, 2001; Falschlunger et al., 2015)2. Measurement 
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distortion exists when there is a discrepancy between the actual data depicted in the graph 
and its graphical representation (Tufte, 1983) caused by enhancing positive trends or 
attenuating negative trends (Beattie & Jones, 1992; 2000b; Falschlunger et al., 2015). The 
use of performance comparisons related to competitors or years can be another way of 
misrepresenting information (e.g., Brühl & Kury, 2016).  
In line with prior literature (Brennan, 2015; Cassar, 2001; Lewellen et al., 1996; Merkl-
Davies & Brennan, 2007), the strategic choice of cross-sectional comparisons is defined as 
the judiciously selective inclusion of these other benchmarks to make the original bank’s 
performance look better.  
Previous studies on impression management have generally followed a purely economically-
based approach (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). No distinction is made between 
omissions or commissions if they lead to the same consequences. These studies argue that 
managers, driven by economic rationality, will always try to exploit information 
asymmetries and provide biased information to maximise their utility (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2011). In line with this assumption, graphs have been found to be favourably 
misrepresented by both omissions (e.g. selectivity) and commissions (e.g. measurement 
distortion) (e.g., Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1999; Mather, Ramsay, & Serry, 1996; 
Falschlunger et al., 2015).  
Psychology provides a different method of interpreting impression management. 
Psychological studies suggest that individuals have an ‘omission bias’ (Spranca et al., 1991). 
This occurs because there is less evidence of causality, responsibility (Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; 
Spranca et al., 1991) and intentionality (DeScioli, Bruening, & Kurzban, 2011). In an 
impression management context, a psychologically-based approach thus suggests that 
managers are more likely to misrepresent information by omission, rather than by 
commission.  
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Psychologically and economically-based perspectives partially compete and overlap. An 
increase in omission practices can be justified by using both an economically-based and 
psychologically-based approach as it both opportunistically provides a more favourable view 
of the firm’s performance and takes into account users’ omission bias. On the other hand, a 
decrease in commission practices can only be justified by a psychological approach, as an 
economically-based approach would predict an increase, rather than a decrease, in wrongful 
commission. 
The global financial crisis represents an ideal setting to investigate impression management 
from a psychological perspective as during the global financial crisis banks’ performance 
was severely hit (Beltratti &Stulz, 2012). Banks came under increasing and intense public 
scrutiny from politicians, regulators, shareholders and the media, with bank managers 
considered as responsible for the crisis (Hargie et al. 2010). Information misrepresentation 
was thus more likely to be detected. 
Consequently, following a psychologically-based approach, we argue that, as annual report 
users’ might evaluate misrepresentation by omission less harshly than misrepresentation by 
commission, banks will change their impression management techniques and focus less on 
commission. We set out four hypotheses below. The first two (H1a and H1b) are consistent 
with both the economically and psychologically-based perspectives, whereas the other two 
(H2a and H2b) are consistent with only the psychological perspective. Thus, we expect that 
during the financial crisis: 
H1a: Banks are more likely to omit graphs of stock market performance indicators in the 
annual report.  
H1b: Banks are more likely to omit graphs of stock market performance indicators in the 
most prominent part of the annual report. 
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H2a: Banks are less likely to display less favourable cross-sectional performance 
comparison in the graphs of stock market performance indicators. 
H2b: Banks are less likely to distort graphs of stock market performance indicators to 
construct a more favourable impression. 
Our theoretical framework and hypotheses are summarised in Figure 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
2.2. Retrospective sense-making  
Retrospective sense-making refers to the current interpretation of past events (Weick, 1995). 
Managers may give an ex-post explanation of past events and convey to the reader a 
complex, contextualized picture of reality. By contextualizing these events they justify them 
but without an opportunistic self-serving intent (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). In a global 
financial crisis context, given the increase in public scrutiny, retrospective sense-making 
might be attractive to bank managers. Major banks given their pivotal role in the economy 
might prefer less opportunistic voluntary disclosure (Abrahamson & Park, 1994). In order to 
continue graphs’ usage during the global financial crisis, managers could engage in 
retrospective sense-making, and increase the level of contextualization in three ways. First, 
graphs could compare a company’s stock market performance with that of competitors.  
Second, companies could use longer time-series to contextualise current stock market 
performance. Finally, companies can portray other performance indicators (e.g. EPS, volume 
of trades, etc.) within the stock market performance graph to provide a reader with a more 
comprehensive, yet more complex, picture of the overall company’s performance.  
In contrast with impression management, the increase in contextualisation is neutral or 
unfavourable rather than self-seeking3 (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). Hence, during the global 
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financial crisis banks are more likely to contextualise their stock market performance and we 
expect that: 
  
H3a: Banks are more likely not only to portray more cross-sectional performance 
comparisons but also to do this in a non-self-serving way  
H3b: Banks are more likely not only to portray longer time-series but also to do this in a 
non-self-serving way 
H3c: Banks are more likely not only to insert other performance indicators within the graph 
but also to do this in a non-self-serving way 
 
3. Research methodology 
3.1 Sample and data gathering 
We selected the European commercial banks from the largest five European economies by 
GDP (Eurostat, 2016): France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, and listed from 2005 to 
2010. We focused on European banks as they operate in a very different economic and 
financial context, compared to US banks, and as the role of banks in providing credit to the 
private and public sectors is important in Europe, interestingly more than in USA (Weigand, 
2015). Also, European banks were affected by the financial crisis after US ones (Allen & 
Faff, 2012). Graphical reporting in bank’s annual reports, being mainly a voluntary choice, is 
unlikely to be affected by national laws and by the recommendations of national central 
banks, thus being a comparable disclosure choice. This period was chosen as it provides an 
excellent setting to investigate the effect of the global financial crisis.  
Using the database Bankscope, we identified 157 listed banks. We excluded the following: 
listed subsidiaries of a holding bank that was already in the sample (20), financial companies 
that close examination revealed were not commercial banks (75), banks that were not listed 
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(or whose annual reports were not available) in all the years covered (16). The final sample 
comprises the whole population of 46 listed commercial holding banks: 10 French banks, 9 
German, 17 Italian, 5 Spanish and 5 from the UK. Bank size was on average equal to € 368 
billion total assets and varied from a minimum of € 185 million total assets to a maximum of 
around € 2.6 trillion (see Table 1).  
We gathered the electronic version of consolidated annual reports from the banks’ websites. 
We then collected data about the graphs’ title, category-topic and type (e.g., column, line, 
etc.), time-series and cross-sectional comparisons and data on other indicators portrayed 
within the graph. Data on banks’ stock market performance were collected from Bankscope 
database by Bureau van Dijk.. 
3.2 Methods 
Stock market performance variables graphed include share price, market capitalisation and 
total shareholder return. We considered 2005, 2006 and 2007 as pre-crisis years and 2008, 
2009 and 2010 as years of global financial crisis. During 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings 
collapsed and the economic crisis erupted globally, with GDP collapsing in most developed 
countries (Keusch, Bollen, & Hassink, 2012). Moreover, 2008-2010 represent a period of 
negativity and uncertainty (Patelli & Pedrini, 2014). For all the banks, we calculated the 
stock market trend. As shown in Figure 2, the stock market performance crashed from 2007 
to 2008. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
 
The average share price was € 30.84 in 2005, € 38.39 in 2006 and € 33.95 in 2007. Then it 
dramatically dropped to € 17.88 in 2008 (see table 1). In 2009 and 2010 the share prices 
remained low at € 18.55 and € 18.25, respectively.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 
 
3.2.1 Selectivity and de-emphasis as measures of wrongful omission in graphical reporting  
Following previous literature (e.g., Beattie & Jones 1992; 1999; 2001; Falschlunger et al., 
2015; Mather, Ramsay, & Steen. 2000), we tested selectivity in graph usage (Hypothesis 1a) 
by using univariate analysis. We used a t-test to investigate whether the average number of 
stock market performance graphs included in a bank’s annual report was significantly lower 
in 2008-2010 than in 2005-2007. To test de-emphasis in a graphs’ location (Hypothesis 1b), 
we considered prominent graphs as those included either at the beginning of the annual 
report (first 5 pages) or within the Highlights (Beattie and Jones 2001). We used a t-test to 
investigate whether the proportion of graphs included in these pages was significantly lower 
in 2008-2010 than in 2005-2007. 
 
3.2.2 Favourable measurement distortion and cross-sectional performance comparisons as 
measures of wrongful commission in graphical reporting  
For graphs’ cross-sectional comparisons (Hypothesis 2a), we first estimated the proportion 
of favourable cross-sectional comparisons within an individual graph. A comparison was 
considered as ‘favourable’ when the competitor’s benchmark provided a lower performance 
than the bank. We then measured the proportion of favourable comparisons across graphs 
included by a bank in the annual report (FAVCOMP). We used a t-test to investigate 
whether FAVCOMP was higher or lower in 2008-2010 than in 2005-2007.  
Following previous studies (e.g. Beattie & Jones, 2000b; Cho, Michelon, & Patten, 2012; 
Frownfelter-Lohrke & Fulkerson, 2001), we estimated the degree of inaccuracy in graphical 
presentation by identifying the degree of graphical distortion. Following previous literature 
(Falschlunger et al., 2015; Mather, Mather & Ramsay, 2005; Muiño & Trombetta 2009), we 
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measured the degree of graph’s distortion using the Relative Graph Discrepancy (hereafter 
RGD) index.4 The RGD index is the difference between the actual height of the last column 
and the height at which it should have been plotted. It is calculated as follows: 
100
3
32 


G
GG
RGD
 
Where: G2 is the actual height of the last column and G3 is the correct height of the last 
column (if plotted accurately) equals to:  
1
21
3
D
DG
G


 
Where: D1 is the value of first data point (corresponding to first column); D2 is the value of 
last data point (corresponding to last column) and G1 is the height of the first column.
 In a 
line-graph, the height of a column is replaced by the distance from the point of the line to the 
horizontal axis.  
To test hypothesis H2b, we first classified graphs as materially or non-materially distorted. 
Material distortions are those detected by the reader (Beattie & Jones, 2002). We considered 
a cut-off level of +/-2.5% to distinguish between material and non-material distortions 
(Falschlunger et al., 2015; Mather et al., 2005; Muiño & Trombetta, 2009). Positive and 
negative values of RGD represent favourable and unfavourable distortions, respectively 
(Mather et al., 2005). Favourable (unfavourable) distortions overstate (understate) increasing 
trends or understate (overstate) declining trends. We measured the proportion of favourably 
distorted graphs (FAVDIST) and unfavourably or not distorted graphs (NONFAVDIST) 
included in an annual report. We used a t-test to examine whether the proportion of 
FAVDIST was higher or lower than NOFAVDIST in 2008-2010 than in 2005-2007 during 
the global financial crisis than before.  
 
3.2.3. Contextualisations as measures of retrospective sense-making in graphical reporting  
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We tested using t-tests retrospective sense-making in graphical reporting. First, we 
examined whether contextualisation increased comparing the pre and during financial crisis 
annual reports in terms of: the proportion of stock market performance graphs with a cross-
sectional comparison, the length of the time-series (i.e. average of the years portrayed within 
the stock market performance graphs); the proportion of stock market performance graphs 
which portrayed, within the graph, also other bank’s performance indicators (e.g., volume of 
trades). Second, we investigated via t-tests whether during the global financial crisis: 
unfavourable cross-sectional comparisons were equal or higher than favourable (Hypothesis 
3a); time-series portraying a declining trend were equal or higher than those with a rising 
trend (Hypothesis 3b); and stock market performance graphs which included other bank’s 
indicators portraying a negative performance were equal or higher than those portraying a 
positive performance (Hypothesis 3c).  
 
4. Findings  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Overall, we found 300 stock market performance graphs: 222 share price, 53 Total 
Shareholders Return and 25 market capitalisation graphs. Out of the 300 graphs, 256 were 
voluntary and 44 were mandatory graphs of Total Shareholders Return (included in the 
annual reports to comply with the UK Directors’ Remuneration Report’s Regulation 2002). 
We considered only the 256 voluntary graphs to test impression management by omission 
(Hypotheses 1a and 1b); impression management by commission in the choice of favourable 
performance comparisons (Hypothesis 2a) and retrospective sense-making (Hypotheses 3a, 
3b and 3c). We excluded the mandatory UK graphs (Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations, 2002) because they are located in a specific part of the report and mandated to 
include cross-sectional performance comparisons.  
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To test impression management by commission via measurement distortion (Hypothesis 2b), 
we considered both mandatory and voluntary graphs, but excluded 12 graphs because RGD 
values were undefined and 5 because the RGD could not be calculated (Mather et al., 2005). 
This results in 283 graphs.  
 
As shown in Table 2, the number of stock market performance graphs included in banks’ 
annual reports decreased from 49 in 2006 to 36 in 2010. In most cases (79%), banks used 
line graphs to represent their stock market performance. Column graphs were also used, but 
less frequently (18%). Other types of graphs were rarely adopted. Table 2 shows a sharp 
decline in the number of column graphs from 24% in 2005 to 8% in 2010, while line graphs 
increased from 76% to 89%, despite a general decline in graphs’ usage.  
On location, we found that almost 8% of graphs appeared in the Highlights or in the first 5 
pages (see Table 2). Out of the 256 voluntary graphs analysed, 141 (55%) included cross-
sectional performance comparisons with 57% of these graphs showing favourable 
comparisons. Favourable comparisons were more common before than during the global 
financial crisis (68% vs. 47%). Most of the graphs analysed (96%) included a time series (at 
least one month portrayed). One-year was the most common length of time horizon graphed, 
representing 47% of the graphs. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Table 3 reports mean and median RGD index values. During the overall period analysed, the 
RGD index mean value was 163.1%. Mean RGD levels were considerably higher with 
favourable rather than unfavourable distortions (RGD = 305.2% vs. RGD = 34.1%). This 
show that impression management was very prevalent. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Table 4 shows the proportion of favourably and non-favourably distorted graphs. The table 
shows that the percentage of distorted graphs in the overall period 2005-2010 was about 
85%. This provides ample evidence of inaccuracy in the graph’s construction. Overall, 
51.5% of stock market performance graphs were favourably distorted. Before the global 
financial crisis the proportion of favourably distorted graphs was much higher than the non-
favourably distorted (67.5% vs 32.5%). By contrast, during the global financial crisis, the 
proportion of non-favourably distorted graphs per bank’s annual report was higher than the 
favourably distorted (66% vs. 34%). 
During the overall period, favourable distortions were mainly caused by an overstatement of 
a rising trend rather than an understated declining trend (42% vs. 9%). This difference was 
mainly driven by the pre-crisis period. Unfavourable distortions were mainly the 
consequence of an exaggeration of a declining trend rather an understated upward trend 
(23% vs. 10%). Overall, graphs were thus more likely to lead to the overstatement rather 
than the understatement of trends. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
4.2. Impression management in graphical reporting: evidence from a psychological 
perspective  
Both the number of stock market performance graphs included in banks’ annual reports (t = 
2.11, p<0.05) and the proportion of those located in its most prominent parts (t = 2.05, 
p<0.05) were significantly higher before than during the global financial crisis (see table 5, 
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panel A). These results support hypotheses H1a and H1b. Banks systematically omitted 
stock market performance graphs from the annual report and from its most prominent parts, 
thus deemphasising stock market performance trends, which mostly declined, during the 
global financial crisis. This was consistent with both an economic and psychological 
approach to impression management. Banks adopted a variety of quite legal techniques in 
their graphical presentations. For instance, a bank might insert a particular graph in the 
Highlights section before the global financial crisis, but then omit it or replace with a 
different graph during the global financial crisis. 
 
 
Our results show that favourable cross-sectional performance comparisons were significantly 
less frequent than before the global financial crisis (46% vs. 68%; t = 3.03, p<0.01). Before 
the global financial crisis, the proportion of favourably distorted graphs was significantly 
higher than the proportion of non-favourably distorted graphs (p<0.01). By contrast, as 
shown in table 5, during the global financial crisis the opposite was true (p<0.05).5 Thus, in 
line with psychologically-based impression management (H2a and H2b, see panel B of table 
5), but not with an economic perspective, we found that banks were less likely, during the 
global financial crisis, to use favourable performance comparisons and favourable 
distortions. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
In Figures 3 and 4 we used typical data which we adapted to give an example of changing 
graph use before and during the global financial crisis. Before the global financial crisis, the 
graph overestimated a rising trend and this led to a favourable distortion. During the global 
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financial crisis, the same graph overestimated a declining trend which led to an unfavourable 
distortion. Both before and during the global financial crisis, the graph was distorted via the 
use of a non-zero axis. 
 
INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 
 
4.3 Retrospective sense-making in graphical reporting: evidence of contextualisation 
We found that the degree of graphical contextualisation increased, although not significantly, 
during the global financial crisis (see table 6). Stock market performance graphs were 
characterised by a slightly greater presence of cross-sectional performance comparisons 
(70% vs. 63%), a higher average number of years portrayed (4.07 vs. 3.16) and a greater 
presence of other performance indicators (16% vs. 13%). The contextualisation provided a 
more unfavourable than favourable view of the bank’s stock market performance. Indeed, 
during the global financial crisis, unfavourable rather than favourable cross-sectional 
comparisons were more frequent (53.5% vs. 46.5%), time-series portraying a declining, 
rather than an increasing, trend were higher (58.8% vs. 41.2%) and stock market 
performance graphs portraying other bank’s indicators (e.g., volume of trades) within the 
graph, displaying a negative rather than a positive performance were higher (57.5% vs. 
42.5%). However, this increase was not statistically significant (see Table 6) and thus we 
found no substantive evidence to support H3a, H3b and H3c 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
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Our paper provides evidence of how preparers of European banks’ graphical reporting 
responded to the global financial crisis by engaging in reactive impression management (i.e. 
they responded in a self-serving way by misrepresenting information to provide a more 
favourable view of banks’ performance) than was warranted. By contrast, we found no 
significant evidence of retrospective-sense making.  
Managers of European banks reacted to the global financial crisis, an unexpected external 
negative shock that increased the uncertainty of annual report’s users (Patelli & Pedrini, 
2014), by misrepresenting information by omission, but avoiding misrepresentation by 
commission. They reduced the use of stock market performance graphs in their annual 
reports, thus deemphasising their negative organizational outcomes. In addition, managers 
de-emphasised the prominence of these graphs, by not inserting them in the most prominent, 
readily-accessible, sections (e.g. the Highlights) of the annual report.  
These findings can be explained by both an economically and a psychologically-based 
perspective. However, we did not find any evidence of an increase in misrepresentation by 
commission in banks’ graphical reporting during the financial crisis. Banks reduced 
favourable distortions and favourable performance comparisons. In times of crisis, therefore, 
banks preferred omitting information (by using selectivity and de-emphasis in location) 
rather than fabricating (or exaggerating) trends. This contrasts with the situation before the 
global financial crisis. This reporting choice seems, prima facie, to be in contrast with prior 
impression management literature, based on an economic view of individual behaviour (e.g., 
Beattie & Jones, 1997; 2000b; Cassar, 2001; Cho et al., 2012). This could be due to the 
limited psychological validity of economically-based impression management in times of 
external crisis. These findings are better explained using a psychological perspective on 
impression management, an approach that takes into account omission bias. We thus show 
that economically-based and psychologically-based perspectives can have a partially 
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competing nature. The latter can provide useful insights by taking into account the fact that 
users may suffer from cognitive biases.  
During the global financial crisis, which caused an unprecedented and systemic economic 
downturn, banks were subject to greater public scrutiny. Thus, bank managers seem to 
prefer, under the fear of detection, misrepresentation by omission (i.e. reduction of the 
number of graphs and the proportion of graphs located in prominent positions) over 
misrepresentation by commission (i.e. increase in favourable performance comparisons and 
favourable distortions). This reporting choice limited public negative reaction and 
condemnation and is still consistent with impression management. Indeed, the intentional 
omission of negative pertinent information is a strategy to introduce reporting bias, by hiding 
negative information from the annual reports’ users (Leung et al. 2015). 
This study contributes to the studies of natural language in corporate annual reports (e.g., 
Beattie & Jones, 2008; Brühl and Kury, 2016; Frownfelter-Lohrke & Fulkerson, 2001; 
Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007; Penrose, 2008; Poole, 2016; Sandell & Svensson, 2016) by 
investigating two potentially complementary scenarios of managerial corporate graphical 
reporting: reactive impression management and retrospective sense-making. In answer to the 
call by Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007), we provide evidence of reactive impression 
management on financial performance, specifically stock market performance graphs. 
Our study also contributes to the development of an impression management theory, by 
using an innovative approach taking into account human cognitive biases, rather than 
adopting a purely economically-based, agency theory approach. Psychological explanations 
of impression management were provided by an emerging literature on narratives (e.g. 
Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). We contribute to this literature by explaining preparers’ visual 
reporting techniques as influenced by users’ cognitive biases, such as the omission bias.  The 
presence of ‘omission bias’ (Spranca et al., 1991) helps to explain why, in contrast with prior 
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economically-based impression management literature (e.g., Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1999; 
Mather et al., 1996; Falschlunger et al., 2015), selectivity in the graphs’ usage, emphasis and 
favourable measurement distortions are not necessarily complementary, but can be 
alternative impression management strategies. In line with prior psychological literature 
(e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Spranca et al., 1991), managers preferred 
misrepresentation by omission over misrepresentation by commission because the former 
tend to be judged less harshly than the latter, even when the negative consequences are 
equivalent.  
This study also improves our understanding of graphical reporting practices adopted by 
banks in their annual reports. We provide evidence that banks changed their visual voluntary 
disclosure in times of great public scrutiny and concern, by taking into account the potential 
users’ reactions. Given the focus of our study, we cannot rule out that annual reports’ 
preparers in other industries might be similarly biased, depending on the external pressure 
faced and on their ability to interpret users’ reactions. Future research is welcomed to 
investigate whether in times of unexpected important exogenous events (e.g. environmental 
disasters or economic crises) wrongful omission practices in disclosure are preferred over 
wrongful commission, in different industries. 
Our study has some limitations that provide opportunities for future research. Our sample of 
banks is relatively small, does not include US banks, but still covers most of the major and 
important European banks (Financial Stability Board, 2011). However, it would be useful to 
extend our study globally and to make a comparison between graphical reporting by 
European and US banks.  
Further testing of the role and influence of cognitive biases and, specifically, omission bias, 
in the broader field of financial reporting and business communication would also be very 
useful. Future research could also investigate to what extent narratives, pictures and other 
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presentational formats are a substitute or a complement to making graphical choices in 
impression management and retrospective sense-making. 
The conclusions derived from this study also have important practical implications.  
Omission of negative information leads to a lower comparability of annual reports over time. 
Readers should take this into account when they use corporate annual reports as the quality 
of their decision-making could be lowered by the omission of graphs within firms’ reports 
(Hirsch et al., 2015). Auditors should assume a greater role in ensuring the neutrality of 
information voluntarily communicated in the annual report, by carefully reviewing visual 
information within the annual reports and, in particular, in the narrative sections. They 
should perhaps compare consecutive years’ annual reports to identify any relevant omissions 
of key financial performance indicators. The study also suggests professional bodies and 
regulators should devise guidelines that can help both preparers and users draw and interpret 
graphical information in a neutral, non-misleading, way. Companies could be mandated to 
indicate any changes in graphical policy or to present certain graphs of specified key 
financial indicators in a fair and accurate way. These graphs would benefit from being 
audited. In the European context, a first attempt has been made by regulators in the UK, who 
require UK quoted companies to produce a directors' remuneration report that must also 
include a graph showing total shareholder return over the last five years (Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002). Future similar attempts would be welcomed.  
                                                 
1 De-emphasis by omitting graphs in prominent parts of the report could also possibly be considered as a 
commission, as it implies a choice of moving a graph from a part of the annual report to another one. However, 
we consider it as a technique of omission, as users tend not to read the entire report (Bartlett & Chandler, 
1997). 
2 Cross-sectional performance comparisons are other benchmarks portrayed by the bank, within the same graph 
and in the same period. These comparisons mainly refer to stock indexes widely published and followed, or 
other groups of competitors. 
3 For instance, more peers (cross-sectional performance comparisons) can be used not only to provide the 
reader with a more contextualized and complex view (retrospective sense making) but also to make the view 
more favourable (impression management). To differentiate between impression management and retrospective 
sense-making, we investigate whether the increase of the cross-sectional contextualization was related to 
favourable or unfavourable contextualization, expecting retrospective sense-making to occur with more neutral 
unfavourable contextualization. 
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4 The index overcomes some of the problems associated with the Taylor and Anderson’s (1986) traditional 
Graph Discrepancy Index (GDI) (Mather et al., 2005). 
5 To test impression management by commission via measurement distortion, we considered both mandatory 
and voluntary graphs. Results would not change excluding all the graphs on Total Shareholder Return 
(mandatory in the UK) and considering only those on share price and market capitalization. 
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Values reported in the vertical axis refer to the average share price in Euro.  
Source: Bankscope database 
 
Figure 2 – Banks’ stock market performance trend 2005-2010. 
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Panel A - Distorted graph in the annual report (inaccurate impression)  Panel B - Correct graph, if plotted accurately (accurate impression)    
 
The graph in Panel A is materially distorted providing an inaccurate impression. The graph in Panel B depicts the same data, but is plotted following the correct graph design 
standards. 
Figure 3 –A typical example of a favourably distorted graph (based on annual reports’ adapted data) with a rising trend before the crisis and of 
the same graph plotted following the correct graph-design standards 
Note: the information contained in this graph is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to be representative of any specific financial product, project, institution or 
individual. 
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Panel A - Distorted graph in the annual report (inaccurate impression)  Panel B - Correct graph, if plotted accurately (accurate impression)    
 
The graph in Panel A is materially distorted providing an inaccurate impression. The graph in Panel B depicts the same data, but is plotted following the correct graph design 
standards.  
Figure 4 – A typical example of an unfavourably distorted graph (based on annual reports’ adapted data) with a declining trend during the crisis 
and of the same graph plotted following the correct graph-design standards 
Note: the information contained in this graph is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to be representative of any specific financial product, project, institution or 
individual. 
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Table 1 – European banks’ characteristics  
Panel A: background characteristics of the firms’ stock market performance and size across the sample period 
  
  Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard deviation Min Max 
  Share price Bank size Share price Bank size Share price Bank size Share price Bank size Share price Bank size 
2005 30.84 272,784 10.67 38,543 49.69 414,360 1.15           185  262.00     1,349,203  
2006 38.39 316,403 14.29 42,500 63.24 488,786 1.02           248  284.90     1,600,000  
2007 33.95 383,039 10.43 46,500 56.82 631,172 0.87           261  260.00     2,600,000  
2008 17.88 426,011 6.35 49,000 31.53 704,966 0.48           365  150.00     2,500,000  
2009 18.55 395,648 7.12 52,000 27.69 603,944 0.29           440  121.00     2,100,000  
2010 18.25 409,791 5.85 56,000 29.45 623,394 0.39           517  132.99     2,000,000  
Whole period 26.31 367,279 9.32 44,500 45.69 588,381 0.29           185  284.90   2,600,000  
Panel B: background characteristics of the firms’ stock market performance and size across countries   
  Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard deviation Min Max 
  Share price Bank size Share price Bank size Share price Share price Share price Bank size Share price Bank size 
France 81.51 557,427 66.85 195,835 71.44 681,274 1.25           650  284.90     2,600,000  
Germany 22.82 239,832 17.79 40,500 22.07 527,729 2.10           185  101.34     2,200,000  
Italy 6.52 187,285 5.98 22,000 4.34 442,453 0.45           372  18.60     2,100,000  
Spain 9.22 232,058 8.63 31,500 4.30 383,283 2.95        1,500  18.46     1,200,000  
UK 6.56 970,023 6.01 841,933 5.12 606,597 0.29     182,330  18.44     2,200,000  
 
Note: 
Share price is the share price at the end of the financial year, in euro.  Bank size is expressed in million euro total assets. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics on voluntary graphs (Number of observations: 256 graphs)  
  2005 2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 Whole period Pre crisis During crisis 
 No % No %  No % No % No % No % No % Mean % Mean % 
No of graphs 46   49    48   40   37   36   256   143   113  
 Type of market performance 
 - Share price 38 82.6 40 81.6  40 83.3 36 90.0 34 91.9 34 94.4 222 86.7 118 82.5 104 92.0 
 - Total Shareholders Return 1 2.2 2 4.1  2 4.2 2 5.0 1 2.7 1 2.8 9 3.5 5 3.5 4 3.5 
 - Market capitalisation 7 15.2 7 14.3  6 12.5 2 5.0 2 5.4 1 2.8 25 9.8 20 14.0 5 4.5 
Type of graphs                                   
 - Column 11 23.9 10 20.4  11 22.9 6 15.0 4 10.8 3 8.3 45 17.6 32 22.4 13 11.5 
 - Line 35 76.1 39 79.6  34 70.8 31 77.5 32 86.5 32 88.9 203 79.3 108 75.5 95 84.1 
 - Other 0 0 0 0  3 6.3 3 7.5 1 2.7 1 2.8 8 3.1 3 2.1 5 4.4 
Graphs’ position                                   
 - Highlighted or first 5 pages 5 10.9 6 12.2  4 8.3 2 5 2 5.4 1 2.8 20 7.8 15 10.5 5 4.4 
 Time-series 
None 3 6.5 3 6.1  4 8.3 1 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 11 4.3 10 7.0 1 0.9 
One year (12 months) 22 47.8 21 42.9  21 43.7 20 50.0 18 48.7 19 52.8 121 47.3 64 44.8 57 50.4 
Two years (24 months) 8 17.4 8 16.3  6 12.5 7 17.5 7 18.9 6 16.6 42 16.4 22 15.4 20 17.7 
Three years (36 months) and 
more 13 28.3 17 34.7 
 
17 35.4 12 30 12 32.4 11 30.6 82 32 47 32.8 35 31 
 Cross-sectional performance comparisons 
Total graphs with benchmarks 25 54.3 24 49  28 58.33 21 52.5 22 59.46 21 58.33 141 55.08 77 53.85 64 56.64 
% of favourable benchmarks  85.6  78.8   40.2  53.4  42  44.3  57.4  67.7  46.5 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics, in %, on measurement distortion Relative Graph Discrepancy (RGD) index (Number of observations: 283 
graphs) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Whole period Pre crisis During crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
All graphs 139.4 46.9 558.8 68.3 49.3 23.9 35.5 28.5 75.3 10.2 32.0 18.8 163.1 27.5 81.7 48.0 81.7 17.1 
 - Share price 196.0 146.4 726.9 118.5 59.6 44.2 34.0 34.0 18.6 9.6 34.8 21.7 192.2 40.9 332.1 73.6 29.4 19.5 
 - Total Shareholders Return 17.6 27.3 39.9 29.2 30.3 7.1 51.0 16.4 347.2 25.5 23.1 13.1 80.6 18.9 28.2 27.3 140.4 16.4 
 - Market capitalisation 29.6 18.6 215.6 7.7 3.1 1.2 5.5 5.5 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0 68.5 3.5 84.0 7.3 3.1 3.1 
Type of Distortion                   
Favourable  173.1 73.3 699.8 112.8 96.4 82.9 58.4 25.6 193.3 18.0 43.4 26.7 305.2 61.5 380.3 100.3 101.4 22.1 
Unfavourable  52.5 2.0 26.1 0.9 40.7 10.4 37.0 31.2 16.5 6.5 37.5 8.8 34.1 7.2 40.8 2.2 31.3 12.0 
 35 
Table 4 - Measurement distortion: proportion of favourably/non-favourably distorted graphs (177 annual reports) 
  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Whole 
period Pre crisis During crisis 
 distorted graphs  0.86 0.91 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.85 0.86 0.83 
% graphs with favourable distortion 0.75 0.87 0.38 0.19 0.41 0.42 0.52 0.68 0.34 
 - % Material exaggeration of a rising trend   0.75 0.82 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.25 0.42 0.63 0.19 
 - % Material understatement of a declining trend   0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.15 
% graphs with non-favourable distortion 0.25 0.13 0.63 0.81 0.59 0.58 0.49 0.33 0.66 
 - % no material distortion 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.17 
 - % Material exaggeration of a declining trend  0.00 0.00 0.33 0.60 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.10 0.38 
 - % Material understatement of a rising trend  0.11 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12 
 
We considered distortions as material with a ±2.5% Relative Graph Discrepancy (RGD) index threshold 
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Table 5 – Tests for the Hypotheses on Omission (H1a and H1b) and Commission (H2a and H2b). 
  Before crisis (A)  During the crisis (B) Difference (B-A) T value   
 Panel A: Hypotheses on omission        
H1a No observation (number of annual reports) 138  138     
 Average number of graphs per annual report 1.23   0.94   0.29 2.11 ** 
H1b No observation (number of annual reports) 138  138     
 Proportion of graphs Highlighted or in the first 5 pages per annual report 0.06   0.02   0.04 2.05 ** 
 Panel B: Hypotheses on commission        
H2a No observation (number of annual reports)(a) 78  74     
 Proportion of banks with graphs with favourable cross-sectional comparisons 
per annual report 
0.68  0.46  -0.22 3.03 *** 
 Favourably distorted          Non-favourably distorted              Difference (B-A)      T value 
H2b No observation (number of annual reports)(b) 93  84     
 proportion of distorted graphs per annual report before the crisis 0.67  0.34  -0.33 4.06 *** 
 proportion of distorted graphs per annual report during the crisis 0.33  0.66  0.33 -3.40 ** 
         
 
Levels of significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p. < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
Note: (a) To test H2a we dropped 124 annual reports as they did not include any stock market performance graph or any stock market performance graph with a cross-sectional performance 
comparison.  
               (b) To test H2b we dropped 99 annual reports as they did not include any stock market performance graph or it was not possible to calculate the Relative Graph Discrepancy (RGD) index. 
We considered distortion as material with a ±2.5% Relative Graph Discrepancy (RGD) index threshold. Results do not qualitatively change by considering the ±5% Relative Graph 
Discrepancy (RGD) index threshold.  
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Table 6   – Tests for the ‘retrospective sense-making’ hypotheses (H3a, H3b, H3c) in stock performance graphs of European banks. 
 
  Before crisis  (A) 
During the 
crisis (B) 
Difference (B-A) T value 
H3a Proportion of annual report with cross-sectional comparisons 0.63 0.70 -0.07 -1.19 
 Proportion of annual report with unfavourable cross-sectional comparisons (C)  0.54   
 Proportion of annual report with favourable cross-sectional comparisons (D)  0.46   
 Difference (D-C)  -0.08  -0.70 
H3b Average of the years portrayed in the graphs 3.13 4.07 -0.94 -1.27 
 Proportion of annual report with unfavourable time-series comparison (C)  0.59   
 Proportion of annual report with favourable time-series comparison (D)  0.41   
 Difference (D-C)  -0.18  -1.71 
H3c Proportion of annual report with stock market performance graphs which include other bank’s 
performance indicators 
0.13 0.16 -0.03 -0.76 
 Proportion of annual report with unfavourable other indicators portrayed within the graph (C)  0.57   
 Proportion of annual report with favourable other indicators portrayed within the graph (D)  0.42   
 Difference (D-C)  -0.15  -0.68 
        
 
Levels of significance (one-tailed test): *** p < 0.01; ** p. < 0.05; * p < 0.10 
Note: (a) To test H3a, H3b and H3c we considered 183 observations as we dropped 93 annual reports as banks did not include any stock market performance graph 
 
